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CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT 
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT: 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.1, 
Appellee Internet Brands, Inc., d/b/a ModelMayhem.com ("Appellee"), a California Corporation, 
certifies that Appellee has a parent company, Micro Holding Corp.; no publicly held corporation 
holds more than 10% of its stock. 
DATED: March 15, 2013 
	 s/Patrick Fraioli 
Patrick Fraioli 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
13379.2:1766666.1 
  Case: 12-56638, 03/15/2013, ID: 8552943, DktEntry: 13, Page 2 of 18
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
	 1 
(a) Statutory Basis of Subject Matter Jurisdiction of the District 
Court 	 1 
(b) Basis for Claiming Order Appealed From is Final and 
Appealable; Statutory Basis of Appellate Court Jurisdiction 
	 1 
(c) Timeliness of Appeal 
	 1 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS RELEVANT TO THE ISSUES 
SUBMITTED FOR REVIEW 	 1 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
	 3 
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
	 3 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING 
APPELLANT'S ONLY CAUSE OF ACTION 
	 NEGLIGENCE— 
FAILED TO STATE A CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF MAY BE 
GRANTED 	 3 
A. Appellee Moved for Dismissal Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 
12(b)(6), Which Was Granted. 
	 3 
B. This Court Upholds Authority Providing Broad Immunity to 
"Publishers or Speakers" 	 5 
C. The Ruling in Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc. Did Not Create an 
Exception to the Immunity Provided by the CDA for Tort 
Claims. 	 8 
III. CONCLUSION 	 10 
13379.2:1766638.1 
  Case: 12-56638, 03/15/2013, ID: 8552943, DktEntry: 13, Page 3 of 18
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES 
Page 
8, 9, 10 
5,  
6, 7, 
6,  
6 
3 
4 
8 
3 
9 
8 
4 
1. 
4 
7 
Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc. 
570 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2009) 	  
Carafano v. Metrosplas .com, Inc. 
339 F.3d 1119 (9 
	 Cir. 2003) 
	  
Conley v. Gibson 
355 U.S. 41 (1957) 	  
De La Cruz v. Tormey 
582 F.2d 45 (9th Cir. 1978) 
	  
Doe II v. MySpace Inc. 
175 Cal. App. 4th 561 (2009) 
	  
Edwards v. Marin Park, hInc. 
356 F.3d 1058 (9t" Cir. 2004) 	  
Goddard v. Google, Inc. 
640 F. Supp 2d 1193 (N.D. Cal. 2009) 
	  
Jane Doe v. MySpace, "Inc. 
528 F.3d 413 (5t Cir. 2008) 	  
Robertson v. Dean Wither Reynolds, Inc. 
749 F.2d 530 (9t Cir. 1984) 	  
Romoland Sch. Dist. v. Inland Empire Energy Ctr., LLC 
548 F.3d 738 (9th Cir. 2008) 
	  
Scheuer v. Rhodes 
(1974) 416 U.S. 232 
	  
Zeran v. Am. Online Inc. 
129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997) 	  
13379.2:1766638.1 
	 ii 
  Case: 12-56638, 03/15/2013, ID: 8552943, DktEntry: 13, Page 4 of 18
STATUTES 
28 U.S.C. § 1291 	  1 
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) 
	  1 
47 U.S.C. §230(c) 	  3, 5 
Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 12(b)(6) 
	  3 
Fed. Rule. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) 
	  1 
13379.2:1766638.1 
	 iii 
  Case: 12-56638, 03/15/2013, ID: 8552943, DktEntry: 13, Page 5 of 18
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
(a) Statutory Basis of Subject Matter Jurisdiction of the District 
Court 
This civil action originated in the District Court based upon diversity 
jurisdiction. The parties are citizens of different states and Plaintiff/Appellant 
seeks damages in excess of $75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) 
(b) Basis for Claiming Order Appealed From is Final and 
Appealable; Statutory Basis of Appellate Court Jurisdiction 
Plaintiff/Appellant appeals from the District Court's Order entered on 
August 16, 2013, dismissing the Plaintff/Appellant's Complaint with prejudice 
pursuant to Fed. Rule. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Appellate courts have jurisdiction over 
final decisions of the district courts that dispose of all claims as to all parties. 
Romoland Sch. Dist. v. Inland Empire Energy Ctr., LLC, 548 F.3d 738, 747 (9th 
Cir. 2008); 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
(c) Timeliness of Appeal 
"In a civil case, the notice of appeal . . . must be filed with the district clerk 
within 30 days after entry of the judgment or order appealed from." Fed. R. App. 
P. 4(a)(1)(A) The District Court dismissed the Appellant's Complaint with 
prejudice on August 16, 2013. Appellant filed her notice of appeal on September, 
5, 2013—twenty (20) days following entry of the dismissal. Respondent does not 
dispute that this appeal is timely. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS RELEVANT TO THE ISSUES  
SUBMITTED FOR REVIEW 
Headquartered in El Segundo, California, Appellee, Internet Brands, is a 
media company that operates various websites and also develops and licenses 
internet software and, social and professional media applications. Within its 
Consumer Internet Division, Appellee owns and operates more than 200 principal 
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websites in seven different categories. One of the websites owned and operated by 
Appellee is "modelmayhem.com" (the "Website")—a social and professional 
networking site for models, make-up artists, stylists, and photographers. (ER' 5) 
Appellant, Jane Doe No. 14, alleges she was assaulted by someone she met 
through the Website.2 Specifically, Appellant alleges she was "lured to come to 
South Florida" where she was drugged and assaulted by unrelated third parties, 
Flanders and Callum. (ER 11, ¶ 2)) Based upon her allegations, Appellant claims 
that Appellee, as the Website owner, should be liable for the acts of these third 
parties because, (1) "[Appellant] was never warned nor given any information 
about this scheme by [Appellee], despite the fact that she was a 
MODELMAYHEM.COM member, which made her particularly vulnerable to the 
scheme" (ER 13, ¶ 10) and (2) [Appellee] had the requisite knowledge to avoid 
future victimizations of MODELMAYHEM.COM users by warning user of online 
predators generally, and of the scheme employed by Flanders and Callum in 
particular." (ER 16-17, ¶ 28) Appellant further alleges that Appellee had a duty to 
warn, a duty to disclose, and a "duty of protection from reasonably foreseeable 
harm." (ER 17 ¶ 33-34). Finally, Appellant alleges that her injuries were caused, 
"as a direct and proximate result of the fraudulent solicitation, drugging, and 
rape..." (ER 14, ¶ 14) Put simply, Appellant's claim relies entirely on her theory 
that Appellee had a common law duty to warn. 
' Refers to Appellant's Excerpts of Record ("ER") 
2 Due to the District Court granting its Motion to Dismiss, Appellee did not 
file an Answer to the allegations in the Complaint. Appellee denies substantially 
all allegations in Appellant's Complaint, including that the alleged assailant 
contacted Appellant through the Website. Review of her account reveals she was 
not contacted by the alleged assailants through the Website. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The District Court did not err in granting the Appellee's Rule 12(b)(6) 
Motion to Dismiss without leave to amend because Appellant's claim is barred by 
the Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. §230(c) ("CDA"). The CDA 
provides Web-based service providers, such as the Appellee, broad immunity from 
claims, such as negligence, stemming from their publication of information created 
by third parties. The Appellant cannot possibly amend her Complaint to state a 
cause of action against the Appellee and her avenue for relief lies with third-party 
tortfeasors, and alleged criminals who are the proximate cause of her damages. 
I.  
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A District Court's grant of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to 
state a claim is reviewed de novo. Edwards v. Marth Park, Inc., 356 F.3d 1058, 
1061 (9th Cir. 2004). A motion under Rule 12(b)(6) should be upheld if "'it 
appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his 
claim which would entitle him to relief[.]"' Id. citing, Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 
41 45-46 (1957). 
II. 
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING APPELLANT'S 
 
ONLY CAUSE OF ACTION—NEGLIGENCE—FAILED TO STATE A 
 
CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF MAY BE GRANTED  
A. 	 Appellee Moved for Dismissal Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 
12(b)(6), Which Was Granted. 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 12(b), provides, in pertinent part, as 
follows: 
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Every defense to a claim for relief in any pleading must be asserted in the 
responsive pleading if one is required. But a party may assert the following 
defenses by motion: 
* * * 
(6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 
* * * 
A Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is similar to the common law 
general demurrer, i.e., it tests the legal sufficiency of the claims stated in the 
Complaint. "The issue is not whether a plaintiffs success on the merits is likely 
but rather whether the claimant is entitled to proceed beyond the threshold in 
attempting to establish [her] claims." Scheuer v. Rhodes (1974) 416 U.S. 232, 236, 
94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90. In considering a Motion to Dismiss brought under 
Rule 12(b)(6), the court's duty is to, "determine whether or not it appears...under 
existing law that no relief can be granted under any set of facts that might be 
proved in support of plaintiffs' claims." De La Cruz v. Tormey, 582 F.2d 45, 48 
(9th Cir. 1978) "A complaint may be dismissed as a matter of law for one of two 
reasons: (1) lack of a cognizable legal theory or (2) insufficient facts under a 
cognizable legal claim." Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 
534 (9th Cir. 1984). 
Appellant's only claim—a claim of negligence for failure to warn 
	 is fatally 
defective. Applicable law does not create a duty of care, a duty to warn, and 
provides immunity under the circumstances alleged in the original Complaint. As 
"no relief can be granted under any set of facts that might be proved in support of 
[Appellant's] claim" as pleaded, dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) was 
appropriate. The District Court properly applied the correct law to the admitted 
facts in this case. 
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B. 	 This Court Upholds Authority Providing Broad Immunity to 
"Publishers or Speakers" 
The Ninth Circuit is in agreement with well-settled authority that establishes 
Appellee does not have a duty to warn its users of the harm alleged and is 
absolutely immune from liability for the harm alleged in this case. Under the law, 
"Web-based service providers", such as the Appellee are provided a broad 
immunity from claims stemming from their publication of information created by 
third parties. 
In rendering its decision, the District Court carefully evaluated the 
applicable Ninth Circuit and California authority in a comprehensive minute order 
with a detailed statement of ruling, citing the factual and procedural background, 
legal standard and discussion. (ER 5-9). The Court found the facts in the instant 
case nearly identical to those of Doe II v. MySpace Inc., 175 Cal. App. 4th 561 
(2009). The court in Doe II carefully and thoroughly reviewed voluminous state 
and federal decisions regarding similar claims to that in this case, and concluded 
that web-based service providers, such as the Appellee, are not liable for common 
law torts committed by one user against another user, absent a separate contractual 
obligation, which does not exist in this case. 
The question posed by this appeal is: Can an Internet Web server such 
as MySpace Incorporated, be held liable when a minor is sexually 
assaulted by an adult she met on its Web site? The answer hinges on 
our interpretation of section 230 of the Communications Decency Act. 
We hold section 230 immunizes MySpace from liability. (citations 
omitted). 
The Doe II court's interpretation of the Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. 
§230(c) (the "CDA"), relied upon extensive and unanimous authority upholding 
the immunity granted by the CDA to web-based service providers for all civil 
claims brought by a web user for harm caused by another user, as set forth more 
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fully below. The Doe II court's interpretation of section 230 of the CDA began 
with a review of the express language of the statute, which provides, in pertinent 
part: 
Protection for 'good Samaritan' blocking and screening of offensive 
material 
(1) Treatment of publisher or speaker 
`No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be 
treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by 
another information content provider. 
(2) Civil liability 
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held 
liable on account of — 
(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or 
availability of material that the provider or user considers to be 
obscene, lewd, lascivious filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or 
otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is 
constitutionally protected; or 
(B) any action taken to enable or make available to information 
content providers or others the technical means to restrict access to 
material described in paragraph (1). 
The Doe II court specifically found that section 230 of the CDA applied to all 
common law torts. "The express language of the statute indicates Congress did not 
intend to limit its grant of immunity to defamation. Instead, the legislative history 
demonstrates Congress intended to extend immunity to all civil claims." Doe II, 
175 Cal. App. 4th at 568. 
The court reviewed uniform authority from this and other jurisdictions, 
including Jane Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413 (5th Cir. 2008) ("Jane Doe v. 
MySpace"); Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2003); and 
Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997) ("Zeran"). Each of those 
cases is directly on point; the first two of which involve the sexual exploitation, 
abuse, or assault of female victims. The Doe II court concluded that the Jane Doe 
v. MySpace case was "exactly on point" and similarly ruled that the CDA provided 
13379.2:176.6638.1 	 6 
  Case: 12-56638, 03/15/2013, ID: 8552943, DktEntry: 13, Page 11 of 18
immunity to web-based service providers, such as the Appellee. Doe II, at 573, fn. 
6. In the Jane Doe v. MySpace case, the Fifth Circuit also held that the immunity 
provision of the CDA still applied even if the Defendant had actual knowledge of 
the alleged tortious conduct. "Thus like strict liability, liability upon notice has a 
chilling effect on the freedom of Internet speech. . . Because the probable effects of 
distributor liability on the vigor of Internet speech and on service provider self-
regulations are directly contrary to §230's statutory purposes, we will not assume 
that Congress intended to leave liability upon notice intact." Jane Doe v. 
MySpace, supra, at 419 (quoting Zeran, supra, at 333.) 
The Doe II court also relied upon the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals 
decision in Zeran, supra, quoting: 
Congress' purpose in providing the §230 immunity was thus evident. 
Interactive computer services have millions of users. The amount of 
information communicated via interactive computer services is 
therefore staggering. The specter of tort liability in an area of such 
prolific speech would have an obvious chilling effect. It would be 
impossible for service providers to screen each of their millions of 
postings for possible problems. Faced with potential liability for each 
message republished by their services, interactive computer service 
providers might choose to severely restrict the number and type of 
messages posted. Congress considered the weight of the speech 
interests implicated and chose to immunize service providers to avoid 
any such restrictive effect. 
Id. at 567. (quoting Zeran, at 331). Finally, authority is also well-settled that a 
web-based service provider need not adopt safety measures in order to receive the 
protection afforded by the CDA. Doe II, at 572-73 ("That appellants characterize 
their complaint as one for failure to adopt reasonable safety measures does not 
avoid the immunity granted by section 230"). 
In this case, Appellant's allegations are identical to those pleaded in the Doe 
II and Jane Doe v. MySpace cases. Appellant alleges she was contacted through 
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the Website and was "lured" to South Florida by her assailants. Her harm occurred 
off-line as a result of tortious conduct by two individuals un-affiliated with 
Appellee. As in the other cases cited by the Doe II court, the allegations do not 
give rise to a cause of action against the web-based service provider because 
Appellee did not owe Appellant a duty to warn, and is entitled to the broad 
immunity provided under the CDA. Therefore, Appellant has failed to state a claim 
upon which relief may be granted because under the circumstances, as a matter of 
law, Appellant cannot possibly overcome the broad immunity provisions under the 
CDA and the applicable case law. The District Court therefore did not err in 
dismissing Appellant's Complaint with prejudice. 
Lastly, Appellant cannot plead or allege that Appellee failed to perform in 
accordance with any legally recognized duty which was the proximate cause of her 
injuries. As with the Doe II and Jane Doe v. MySpace cases, the injury occurred 
off-line, which means the web-based service provider was not the proximate cause 
of the Appellant's injury. Julie Doe II, at 574. Here, Appellant pleaded that her 
injuries were caused by unrelated third parties, not Appellee. As such, and 
consistent with authority on this point, Appellant cannot state a claim for relief in 
the absence of a proximate causation allegation, which is an additional, 
independent basis upon which to dismiss the Complaint. The District Court's 
dismissal of the Appellant's Complaint would therefore also have been proper due 
to the absence of proximate causation on the allegations by Appellee. 
C. 	 The Ruling in Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc. Did Not Create an Exception 
to the Immunity Provided by the CDA for Tort Claims. 
Appellant relies entirely on this Court's holding in Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 
570 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2009). However, Appellant grossly misstates the holding 
in that case and its inapplicability to the very different record in this case. 
13379.2:1766638.1 	 8 
  Case: 12-56638, 03/15/2013, ID: 8552943, DktEntry: 13, Page 13 of 18
Appellant also fails to address another opinion issued only 8 days later in Goddard 
v. Google, Inc., 640 F. Supp 2d 1193 (N.D. Cal. 2009). 
First, the Barnes case held that the CDA did protect Yahoo!, a Web-based 
service provider, from liability for negligence, but did not immunize it from a 
promissory estoppel claim arising from entirely different facts, where Yahoo! 
contracted to remove certain posts from its site. However, the Court was clear in its 
narrow ruling: 
Therefore, we conclude that, insofar as Barnes alleges a 
breach of contract claim under the theory of promissory 
estoppel, subsection 230(c)(1) of the Act does not 
preclude her cause of action.4 
Only eight days later, in the Google case, this Court discussed extensively the 
application of the new ruling in Barnes and held as follows: 
Read as broadly as possible, Barnes stands for the 
proposition that when a party engages in conduct giving 
rise to an independent and enforceable contractual 
obligation, that party may be "h[eld] ... liable [not] as a 
publisher or speaker of third-party content, but rather as a 
counter-party to a contract, as a promisor who has 
breached. 
The court went on to discuss that there was no allegation that Google ever 
promised the Plaintiff it would do something above and beyond what it was 
otherwise obligated to do, and refused to extend the Barnes holding. The same is 
true here. Appellee is not alleged to have as a publisher of third-party content, 
become a promisor of independent and enforceable contractual obligations, and 
then breached those obligations. Thus, Barnes has no applicability to this case. 
Similarly, Appellant's contention that Appellee somehow assumed a duty to 
warn by filing suit against the prior owners of the Website, for breach of contract 
4 Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2009) (emphasis added). 
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and fraud in the sale of the Website, also fails. First, that Complaint is not part of 
the record on appeal. Moreover, Appellant's contention is contradicted by its own 
admission and by Barnes. Appellant here claims only that the suit showed 
knowledge of other torts or crimes, giving rise to a duty to warn. (ER 16, 11122-18, 
¶40.) As set forth above, this does not give rise to a duty to warn on the part of 
web-based publishers of third-party content. Nor does it bring the facts of this case 
within Barnes' narrow "independent and enforceable contractual obligation" 
exception, since no such promise or obligation was ever even alleged in this case. 
It is a classic red herring. 
III. 
CONCLUSION 
The law is well-settled and unanimous; the CDA provides immunity to web-
based service providers for common law torts committed by website users. 
Persons injured or otherwise damaged by third party tortfeasors are not without 
remedy, and may hold directly liable the person(s) causing the harm. Appellant's 
relief rests with the alleged third party tortfeasors, but her claim against Appellee is 
barred as a matter of law under the CDA and applicable case law. 
By: 	 s/ PatrickTraioli 
Patrick Fraioli 
Ervin Cohen & Jessup LLP 
Attorneys for Internet Brands. Inc. 
9401 Wilshire Blvd.. 9th Floor 
Beverly Hills. CA 90212-2974 
Tel: (310) 273-6333 
Fax: (310) 859-2325 
Wendy Giberti 
iGeneral Counsel. P.C. 
Attorneys for Internet Brands. Inc. 
9595 Wilshire Blvd.. Suite 900 
Beverly Hills. CA 90212 
Tel: (310) 300-4082 
Fax: (310) 300-8401 
13379.2:1766638.1 
	 10 
  Case: 12-56638, 03/15/2013, ID: 8552943, DktEntry: 13, Page 15 of 18
STATEMENT OF RELATED CASES  
The undersigned is unaware of any related cases pending in this Court. 
s/ Patrick Fraioli  
13379.2.1766638.1 
	 11 
  Case: 12-56638, 03/15/2013, ID: 8552943, DktEntry: 13, Page 16 of 18
Form 6. 	 Certificate of Compliance With Type-Volume Limitation, 
Typeface Requirements, and Type Style Requirements 
1. This brief complies with the type-volume limitation of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7)(B) 
because: 
rg this brief contains 3,379 	 words, excluding the parts of the brief exempted 
by Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7)(B)(iii), or 
I— this brief uses a monospaced typeface and contains 	 lines of text, 
excluding the parts of the brief exempted by Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7)(B)(iii). 
2. This brief complies with the typeface requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(5) 
and the type style requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(6) because: 
17-< this brief has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using (state name 
and version of word processing program) Microsoft Office Word 
(state font size and name of type style) 14 - New Times Roman 	 , or 
r this brief has been prepared in a monospaced spaced typeface using (state name 
and version of word processing program) 
with (state number of characters per inch and name of type style) 
Signature Is/Patrick Fraioli 
Attorney for Defendant Internet Brands, Inc. 
Date (March 15, 2013 
  Case: 12-56638, 03/15/2013, ID: 8552943, DktEntry: 13, Page 17 of 18
Signature (use "s/" format) 
9th Circuit Case Number(s) 12-56638 
NOTE: To secure your input. you should print the filled-in form to PDF ( File > Print 
	 PL)/: 
********************************************************************************* 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
When All Case Participants are Registered for the Appellate CM/ECF System 
I hereby certify that I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court for the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit by using the appellate CM/ECF system 
on (date) March 15, 2013 
I certify that all participants in the case are registered CM/ECF users and that service will be 
accomplished by the appellate CM/ECF system. 
Signature (use "s/" format) s/Patrick Fraioli 
********************************************************************************* 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
When Not All Case Participants are Registered for the Appellate CM/ECF System 
I hereby certify that I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court for the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit by using the appellate CM/ECF system 
on (date) 
Participants in the case who are registered CM/ECF users will be served by the appellate 
CM/ECF system. 
I further certify that some of the participants in the case are not registered CM/ECF users. I 
have mailed the foregoing document by First-Class Mail, postage prepaid, or have dispatched it 
to a third party commercial carrier for delivery within 3 calendar days to the following 
non-CM/ECF participants: 
  Case: 12-56638, 03/15/2013, ID: 8552943, DktEntry: 13, Page 18 of 18
